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PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM: CONCEPTIONS OF
INTERPRETATION AND THE RELIGION CLAUSES
KENT GREENAWALT*

I. INTRODUCTION

I began working on this paper hoping to arrive at a comfortable
understanding of progressive constitutionalism, from which I could then
explore interesting questions regarding the interpretation of the religion
clauses. As I quickly ran into thorny theoretical questions, I realized things
were not so simple.
Initially, one needs a sense of what "constitutionalism" covers within the
context of progressive constitutionalism. Constitutionalism might refer to
whatever subject matter is covered by a written constitution, to basic
structural features of a government, or to everything that is of political
importance. The last usage is unedifying, even if it packs rhetorical force.
Constitutionalism is not restricted to countries with written documents; for
example, Great Britain has constitutional structures and conventions
without a written constitution. In the United States, however, most matters
that would be "constitutional" in countries without written constitutions,
as well as some other subjects, are embraced by written constitutions of
federal and state governments. Unless another explanation is provided, we
may consider "progressive constitutionalism" in the United States as
covering subjects related to our written constitutions. The term is certainly
broad enough to reach criticisms of constitutions and proposals for
amendments or total revisions. The term also includes interpretation of
constitutions by members of the political branches as well as judges.
In this paper, I concentrate on the narrower, more typical topic of
judicial interpretation. At least in regard to the religion clauses, this may be
warranted because any progressive constitution would probably include
something similar to the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses, and these
would be judicially enforceable to some degree.
The first part of this essay explores relations between progressive values
and interpretive approaches. When I asked myself how a judge, committed
to progressive values, would interpret the Federal Constitution, I was
troubled by whether a progressive approach would be activist or restrained
in relation to legislative authority. I concluded that how one would answer
that question depends partly on the time frame one chooses for evaluation.
I have ambivalently chosen to look forward roughly half a century.
The remainder of the essay argues that as far as the religion clauses are
concerned, the government should adhere to the present constitutional and
legislative approaches of leaving great autonomy to religious institutions,
* University Professor, Columbia University School of Law.
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even when they are far from being progressive in their governance. If you
agree that progressive constitutionalism faces serious problems concerning
how retrogressive religious groups should be treated, and you further agree
about how these problems should be resolved, then you will conclude either
(a) that progressive constitutionalism is not an apt prescription for every
subject, or (b) that progressive constitutionalism contains a plurality of
sometimes competing values that yield treatment of religion that is unusual
in comparison to the treatment of many other subjects of law.

I. PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM
A. Progressive Values andInterpretivePossibilities
Progressive constitutionalism is primarily an understanding of the
Constitution that furthers progressive political values. Second, progressive
constitutionalism involves a progressive understanding of the nature of law
and constitutional interpretation.
Progressive political values include economic welfare, especially for the
less fortunate; equality of treatment for persons of different genders, races,
ethnic origins, religions, and sexual orientations; individual freedom to make
significant life choices; nondomination; mutual concern; substantial health
care; environmental protection; and, notably, a reduction in the power
exercised by major private institutions, such as large corporations.
Although the original progressive movement emphasized government's
capacity to dispel private power in the public's interest, the twentieth
century has indelibly taught the damage that modern governments can
inflict on progressive values. A modern progressive who hopes that
government can combat irresponsible private authority must also remain
cautious of irresponsible government. In other words, progressive
constitutionalism must aim to protect against dangerous government while
allowing government to respond to private abuse.
Devising a progressive view of law proves more difficult than naming
progressive political values. One might ask either what conception of law
reflects a progressive understanding of human society or what idea of law
will promote progressive political values. According to a progressive
understanding of society, law is not highly rigid or cabined by some narrow
original understanding. Typically, a view of law that fits a progressive social
understanding will also promote progressive values, but this will not always
be so. When political structures are highly unjust, as in the former Union
of South Africa, a conception of law that contains a highly technical, narrow
understanding of the scope of legislation may best limit the destruction of
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human values by political actors.'
A progressive approach to constitutional interpretation recognizes that
various answers to interpretive problems are often plausible. Ordinarily, it
would recommend interpretation responsive to modem concerns.2 Would
such interpretation be activist or restrained?
A judge or justice may be restrained, or activist, vis-a-vis original
understanding, legislative assertion, or developed judicial doctrines. Some
justices have a philosophy of restraint concerning one or two of these, but
not the other(s).3 Some decisions are activist or restrained by all three
criteria.' But frequently, what is activism by one standard is restraint by
another.5
Progressive interpretation would not typically be wedded tightly to
original understanding or prior doctrine, although when the political
branches are antiprogressive, originalism, or adherence to precedents, may
help stem the prevailing tide. The progressive constitutional approach
toward legislative authority is more complex. In the first half of the
twentieth century, progressive views were linked to judicial restraint, and
the conservative Supreme Court was viewed as blocking legislative
improvement of economic and social conditions. In addition, decisions by
elected representatives were regarded as more progressive in their processes
than judicial mandates. For the next few decades, judicial restraint in respect
to economic legislation was joined with activism in reviewing legislative
choices limiting civil liberties and civil rights. A philosophy expressed
succinctly in the famous CarolineProductsfootnote6 about the circumstances
1. See generallySTEPHEN ELLMANN, IN A TIME OF TROUBLE: LAW AND LIBERTY IN
SOUTH AFRICA'S STATE OF EMERGENCY (1992).
2. As Robin West has suggested, progressivism does not necessarily dictate whether
one is a natural lawyer, a positivist, or an instrumentalist about law, though someone whose
political and jurisprudential views are progressive will be a certain kind of natural lawyer,
positivist, or instrumentalist. ROBIN WEST, PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTONALISM, 211-81

(1997).
3. Justice Black and Justice Scalia have claimed to be restrained tightly by original
understanding, but have freely rejected received doctrines and legislative choices. Justice
Harlan, for whom I worked, was relatively restrained along all three dimensions.
4. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113 (1979) (representing activism by departing from
original understanding, leaving the moorings of existing judicial doctrine, and treating as
unconstitutional standard legislative approaches).
5. See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997) (holding the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act invalid as it applies to the states, an undoubtedly activist decision
in undercutting a nearly unanimous vote of Congress; it purports to be restrained in being
rooted in the original understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment). Whether one believes
that its position is more in line with prior decisions than the competing view depends
substantially on which prior decisions one regards as most important.
6. Seee.g., United States v. Caroline Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 (1938). Footnote
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in which legislative choice needed a check, justified this divergence of
approach.
B. ProgressiveValues andPhilosophiesofInterpretation
How exactly might a progressive arrive at a philosophy of judging for
constitutional cases? How would she relate a philosophy of interpretation
to political values and a conception of law? One issue is the level of
abstraction between a strategy of interpretation and particular political
choices. An example of the starkest position would be: "Judges should
decide every constitutional case to promote progressive political values,
unless the relevant legal arguments are overwhelming in the other
direction." This approach might be defended in either of two ways. The
first defense would be that all judging is inevitably mainly political; better
that judges decide in accord with good progressive values rather than bad
competing values. The second defense would be that judging should be
largely political in this sense, and that progressive political values are the
correct, or best, values.
Judging need not be, and should not be, as overtly political as these two
defenses suggest; moreover, such unvarnished reference to unmediated
political values could not undergird a philosophy of judging that will win
public acceptance. Apart from their lack of respect for broader "legal
values," both approaches invite a similar attitude toward judging among
antiprogressives. That is, the antiprogressives can say that judging is mainly
political, so judges should decide against (what they see as) undesirable
progressive values. Unless our politics and judiciary are mostly progressive,
Four provides in pertinent part,
There may be a narrower scope for operation of the presumption of
constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be within a
specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten
amendments, which are deemed equally specific when held to be
embraced by the Fourteenth .... It is unnecessary to consider now
whether legislation which restricts those political processes which can
ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation, is
to be subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny under the general
prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment than are most other types of
legislation .... Nor need we enquire whether similar considerations
enter into the review of statutes directed at particular religious, or
national, or racial minorities, whether prejudice against discrete and
insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to
curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied
upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly
more searching judicial inquiry. (Citations omitted). Id.
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which has certainly not been our experience over the last three decades,
blatant political judging in constitutional cases will hardly promote
progressive goals. A defensible philosophy of constitutional interpretation
cannot make immediate political objectives the overarching guide for
particular decisions. It must provide an account of why, and when, judges
should decide in accordance with progressive or other political values.
In a defensible theory of interpretation, should there be any tie between
progressive (or other such) political values and a philosophy of
interpretation? If so, how direct should that tie be? What is the time span
one should employ for evaluating an approach to interpretation?
One conceivable answer to all three questions is that because our
Constitution, at least after the Civil War Amendments, is basically a
progressive document, the guiding spirit of interpretation should be
progressive. This answer makes the Constitution itself the link between
progressive values and constitutional decision. This answer would be good
for the life of the Constitution! Unfortunately for this approach, the
Constitution is mixed. Some parts, such as the Equal Protection Clause,
embody certain progressive values; other parts are not decidedly progressive.
For some progressive values, such as environmental protection, the written
Constitution has little bearing. A second problem with heavy reliance on
values contained within the written Constitution is that a progressive
understanding of law fits uncomfortably with having modem decisions
determined by attitudes underlying a document whose crucial parts are more
than a century old.
If the Constitution itself does not produce a dominant place for many
progressive values, can one find another ground for making those values
central in constitutional interpretation? A desirable philosophy of
interpretation needs to rest on many bases besides a desirable political
program; however, one appropriate standard for choosing interpretive
strategies is how they will fit with desirable political programs over time.
Over how long a time? As I have already suggested, the connection
between any particular interpretive strategy and assistance to a set of
political values is bound to change. Judicial restraint vis-a-vis legislative
choice may be best for progressive values in one era; judicial activism may
be best in another. In developing a philosophy of interpretation, one might
ask what standards will be best for progressive political values over the
entire life of a political order, what will be best in the immediate future, or
what will be best in some intermediate range.
I am tempted by the "entire life" approach, but it presents some obvious
difficulties. One such difficulty is the near impossibility of making
judgments about a political order that may extend centuries into the future.
7. Of course, the Constitution could be amended to make it less progressive or even
antiprogressive.
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We can make more confident assessments about the recent past and near
future. A second difficulty is that the best strategies for the entire life of a
political order might work unfavorably over substantial periods. One might
end up defending an approach as favorable to progressive values while
acknowledging that the approach is unfavorable to those values operating
over the span of one's adult life. These difficulties could be ameliorated but
not eliminated by a conclusion that only some progressive values,
particularly equality, should help determine interpretive strategies.
Someone who focused attention on immediate consequences would, if
candid, have to shift standards of interpretation with elections to political

offices and with judicial appointments. The standards would be highly
manipulable in terms of immediate advantage for political goals. This
approach would not be quite the same as recommending decisions according
to a judge's direct political evaluation, but it would be subject to similar
drawbacks.
An approach that seeks continuity in interpretive strategies, but gives due
respect to context and contingency in human life, as well as to historical
uncertainty, might span a half century or so in order to adequately assess
whether a strategy of constitutional interpretation will match progressive
values.8 If we assume (as I am not sure I do) that all philosophies of
interpretation should be tied to political values in the sense I have been
discussing, then perhaps we should think about relevant connections for
such an intermediate past and future?9

II.

THE RELIGION CLAUSES

Let us assume that progressive constitutional interpretation is not closely
tied to original understanding or settled doctrine, that it is somewhat flexible
about how much deference to give to legislatures, and that one standard for
handling a broad area of law is what promotes progressive values over time.
How should the religion clauses be understood?
A. How To Treat UnprogressiveReligion
I see a fundamental dilemma for religious practices and government that
is based on the following realities and perspectives in political and
constitutional philosophy. First, insofar as the state and some private
institutions dominate economic and social relations and culture in
undesirable ways, religious organizations and religious belief and practice are
8. Michael Perry adopts a position like this in MORALITY, POLITICS AND THE LAW:
A BICENTENNIAL ESSAY, 136-51 (1988).
9. WEST, supra note 2, at 281-89 (discussing the need to link progressive
constitutionalism with legislative action as opposed to the adjudicative realm).
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important counterweights. Of course, the picture is complex; however,
many religious groups have emphasized antimaterialistic and anticompetitive
values, or contributed significantly toward equality, or both.
Second, without doubt, some religious organizations inhibit freedom (in
the ordinary secular sense) and perpetuate inequality and domination. In
many religions, ordinary members are crucially unequal to clergy. Some
religions allow only males to become clergy, and some teach a more
comprehensive division of functions according to gender. We can speak of
religious denominations as being more or less progressive in various respects;
by progressive standards, many religious groups are retrogressive. A further
point concerns religious emphasis on faith and tradition. Religious practice
often downplays ordinary rational thought as a technique for resolving
personal and social problems. If progressivism involves confidence in the
ability of reason to resolve social problems, much religious life may be
intrinsically at odds with progressive political philosophy. 0
Third, some of the most hierarchical and gender-riven religions have been
the most active in opposing undue competitiveness and economic inequities.
I have in mind particularly recent Roman Catholic teachings in the United
States about economic welfare and social injustice. No neat correlation
exists between religions that are internally progressive and those that
support progressive political programs.
Fourth, a strong political and constitutional tradition insists that the
government should stay out of the internal life of religious groups and not
favor particular forms of religious governance and practice over others. This
tradition is a key component in a particular liberal view that asserts that
government should not support one belief about the good life over any
other. In discussions about neutrality and the good life, some liberals offer
the treatment of religion as an example to be generalized: "Just as the
government does not say what religion is best, it should not dictate what
forms of life are best." One must be cautious not to link the fate of the
example with the status of the broader claims. Even if progressivism rightly
rejects neutrality about forms of the good life, the liberal resolution of the
problem of religion may well be sound.
Here is the basic dilemma. If private organizations effectively constrain
the freedom of individuals and perpetuate inequalities, the typical
progressive prescription is that government should intervene against these
private centers of power. Certainly these triggering conditions are met by
many religious organizations. They constrain freedom in various ways and
perpetuate inequalities. Should the ordinary progressive approach be
applied to religious organizations, with government forbidding
10. Suzanna Sherry has claimed that: . .. our Constitution does-as a matter of
history-and ought to-as a matter of policy-privilege reason over faith." Suzanna Sherry,
Enlighteningthe Religion Clauses, 7 J. CONT. LEGAL ISSUES 473, 477-78 (1996).
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discrimination by them that it would not tolerate by other private
institutions? Should it require that women be admitted to the priesthood,
that churches and similar groups adopt democratic forms of internal
governance over hierarchical ones, that parents expose children to many
religious options, so that children can decide freely what religion, if any,
suits them? Should government directly encourage these approaches if it
does not require them?" Requirements or serious encouragements would
intrude the state to a great degree in the religious lives of its citizens,
something generally regarded as highly undesirable.
The painful dilemma that I have just described is largely responsible for
why we hear so little concerning the progressive approach to church and
state relations.12 I have little difficulty concluding that the better course is
for government to continue to stay out of its citizens' religious lives,
maintaining the liberal resolution of that problem. I also believe that, in
most respects, that resolution should be treated as constitutionally
compelled. The detriment of government involvement in religious affairs
far outweighs any likely beneficial promotion of progressive values in
internal religious practice. Perhaps my evaluations demonstrate the limits
of my commitment to progressive principles. I like to think that they show,
instead, some of the complexities that any tenable progressive philosophy
of government has to include.

B.Exemptionsfor Religious Conscience
Let me say a few words about two other religion clause problems. Should
exemptions from ordinary laws for those whose religious conscience forbids
compliance with such laws be constitutionally required, or allowed? One
argument against exemptions is that citizens should be treated identically
under the law. Another argument is that no concessions should be made to
nonrational or irrational grounds for separate treatment. From the
perspective of progressive values, however, the liberty to act on religious
conscience, when no state interest is seriously threatened, seems more
important. I put aside here issues of judicial administrability that have
troubled the Supreme Court. However, either by constitutional
11. Insofar as the government teaches tolerance and equality in the political sphere, it
may have some indirect effect on parties and attitudes within religious groups; but the
production of such indirect effects is different from setting out self-consciously to alter life
within religions.
12. Robert Justin Lipkin has written a thoughtful article on this subject from the
standpoint of a "pragmatist communitarian" position. See Robert Justin Lipkin, Religious
Justificationin theAmerican CommunitarianRepublic, 25 CAP. U. L. REV. 765 (1996). After
a deeper and more extended analysis than mine, he reaches conclusions that are generally
similar.
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interpretation or legislative choice, exemptions should also be extended to
people who have claims of conscience that exercise similar internal
compulsion but lack any ordinary religious basis. For most circumstances,
the constitutional argument for equality of conscience is powerful. If it does
not derive mainly from a progressive outlook, it fits well with it.

C.Aid to ParochialEducation
Aid to parochial education is a perplexing problem that raises issues how
particular doctrines and outcomes should connect to political values. I begin
here with two assumptions. First, children should be able to attend private
schools, including religious ones, if their parents wish. Second, the
government properly assists many private endeavors, such as hospitals, that
perform important public functions. Helping all private enterprises, except
religious ones, would involve a form of inequality not easy to justify from
a progressive point of view. One can embrace each of these assumptions
and still worry about general, substantial aid to private schools including
religious schools. Perhaps public schools are a critical locus for promoting
progressive values and for building necessary attitudes towards diversity. I
believe it once was true that public schools were more likely to contribute
to liberal democratic values than parochial and other private schools. That
may no longer be true; however, suppose a Supreme Court Justice thinks
that public schools continue to be the vital seedbed of democratic and
progressive values, and that they will inevitably suffer in quality if private
schools get a bigger slice of the educational pie and are able to draw a larger
proportion of able students than they now do. Should that influence the
Justice's decision concerning a voucher program that includes religious
schools, and should she provide that as a reason in an opinion? These are
hard questions. I am inclined to think that this assessment would
appropriately figure into analysis to some degree, and a Justice could
explicitly refer to lasting values of public schools in American life.
IV. CONCLUSION

The first half of this paper faces some troublesome questions regarding
how progressive values might figure in a philosophy of constitutional
interpretation. I suggest that they may play a background role but should
not be the main criteria of decision in particular cases. With hesitancy, I
offer an intermediate time range as the appropriate standard for gauging
which interpretive approaches will cohere with progressive values.

The second half of this paper discusses the special problem of religious
liberty and nonestablishment. In general, a progressive favors government

interference with large, organized centers of power that perpetuate
inequality and domination.

Some religions fit into this category. But
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religious autonomy is also an important value from a progressive point of
view. I argue that, on balance, the liberal resolution of noninterference with
religious activities warrants continued endorsement.

